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SUMMAR_
._ During the past few years, methods have been developed to predict the
reliability of aircraft structures. They depend upoT inspection effective-
hess which, in turn, depends upon structural complexity, quality, and the
percentage of the structure inspected. Reliability can be enhanced by
choosing materials properly, designing damage-tolerant structures, and
increasing inspection frequency. And, for fleet operations, costs can be
minimized through proper inspection schedules, and enhanced reliability
can be compatible with minimum cost. The methods are derived from a combi-
nation of probability theory and engineering equations.
":_ INTRODUCTION
_ During the past few years, methods have been developed to predict the
reliability of aircraft structures. T11emethods are derived from a combi-
: nation of probability theory and engineering equations. Their earliest
application was to military aircraft operations, where the military urgently
needed ways to prolong fleet llfe and to ensure that enough aircraft were
: always available for use. The purpose of this paper is to acquaint the
operators of the commercial fleet with these methods and how they have been
used to improve reliability and reduce the cost of operations.
The discussions in this paper are not meant to serve as "cookbook"
guides to application, but only to synopsize some of the methods apDlicab]e
to commercial fleet operation. Those who wish to apply these methods to
their own fleet operations are urged to consult the references which
discuss, in more detail, how the methods are used and what data are needed
as input for the analyses.
INSPECTION
Reliability methods depend upon inspection. Figure i shows a typical
' inspection problem encountered in the laboratory. The specimen, about
5.5 cm wide, is subjected to repeated loads in tension. If a crack grows,
it will start at the small drilled holes and will propagate across the
width. Cracks 0.1 mm long can be found easily for two reasons: the
inspector knows where to look, and the specimen is accessible.
!_ Figure 2 is a photograph of an aircraft wing box, a much harder inspec-
tion problem. Sometimes the inspector knows where to look (for example, if
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._ he is responding to tin airwortht.r,_;s ,llr,,t.tlw,). but, even so t crack_ can occur
, anywhere. And a few part:a of llft' ,';t[ll,'lltl_' ;l*t' Imwce_stble to anything except
..... a teardowa, inspection. Practt,:nl i,l:;i.,_:l i,.t ;rod reliability methods must take
_,: Into account the posstl_llJty t,[ r;m,t,.. I!:l_., I,-',,tlt_ns. multiple flaws, and area
" inaccessibility.
"', Tile reliability after hlsi,,,ct Itm d.l.,ntl_ t,i.,n how well a crack can be
i/ detected. Figure 3 (refs. 1 to 3) :d._wq :_,,u,e typical data for the probability
', of detection (solid lines) In c..t_a.jt, the dashed lines show some empirical
.... fits; they can be adjusted analytically to re;itch reasonably smooth experimental
. curves fairly well. Iu general, th,, l,,,d.fl_Ility of detection is larger for --.
_': longer cracks. Ultrasonic,; and tly_, p_nt_t t anl [n:q_ections are more sensitive
i_ than X-rays. but to use them the area mu.;t bc accessible. X-rays are used for
= _:, inaccessible areas, but the radiati.tnt :4t_u_t.c must be positioned directly over
,_ the crack. The data in figure 3 are from dctcctablllty tests generally under
o!i': laboratory conditions. Part of the rt,a:_on that the experimental curves are not
=}" smooth is the paucity of data, ew'n tht,ugh these curves were obtained during an
_; extensive and well-planned program. Tht: ullevt:nnessof the curves illustrates a
S
point: not much data exist yet about the infq_ectJon process, a process that
:,'*' includes both apparatus and inspector. A ,_tatistician, of course, would want
-_ enough data points to establish 90-l,e_cunt or 95-percent bounds on the curves.
_, Figure 4 (ref. 4) shows out of tlt,_,empirical curves. It has several
_! features. First, if tilecrack is _;!,c,rt ,cough, it cannot be found (detect-
"ii ability is 0). Second, there is u c_a_'k length that corresponds _o some given
_ detectability; here, cracks el length . ut_d longer can be found at least
90 percent of the time. And finally the curve may never reach 1.0 because, for
"_il various reasons, eveu long cracks art,occa.,;[tmallyoverlooked. Sometimes the
,y curve may not be completely defined, but l_,r'st,_leuses, only the crack length
/ at some percent of detectability n_:etl:_t_,be known. Such a simple case is con-
!! sidered first.
%:L
_'i With these aspects it,lnind, figure 5 (tel. 5) relates tile reliability after
% inspection to the probabl]ity lhat the l>att was crack free before inspection.
oi:_ Reliability here has a specific meaning: n part that has passed inspection has
}i passed because it was thought to haw_ bt,en crack tree. Reliability after
_. inspection is the probability that the part actually Is crack free. Detect-
i ability is a parameter for the x,:iriott:;t:urw,_;, llere the inspector knows where
_ to look, and only must decide wlleth,,r,,_,,.,'ra,:kof some given length (such
as 4 mm) or longer is, or Is ,_2t, l,lt,;t'!,t,l'}_Jsis o simple inspection case.
V Note that all the curves llc al,,,x,_,tl_t,,,,,--i_.;p_,<tJonline, showing that inspec-
_.;; lions always enhance reliability. And, beca,*st'riley increase monotonically,
Oo, high i_itlal quallty (re] inbl Iilv ht,(,,rt,it,,,l,t,uti_:n) alwa)s enhances final
_' reliability
,t
,_: llowever, quite frequently a cr,u'l,,,r _r:_,'k_con appear at random locations
' (as, for example, in tim struc'tul_,i,, fir. ?-). A,M, in such a case, the actual
"4 number of cracks is not k.own, l'!_:,,al_, t., :.h_,_,:_. th,. r,.liabllity after inspection
._.. as a function of tile detect;d, it_t., _,,_ t!!, ,',u;, wl,t, rt: t.}lc actual number of
cracks in a given pletc I,;a t,i,,,l,,,,_,.,,I,,_, l',,i:;,:tmdistributed. The mean (or
-J_; average) number of cracks pcr l,i,,., I,,i,,,, i.t;l,,'t!],,nIs the parameter shown
beside each curve. Crae_,*_t:_lght 1,, ;mvwl,,_,, it, the. structure Reliability
:,' 356
¢
g
J
t;•
O0000004-TSG03
">. [
t'
,i
_'::, is significantly enhaiwed if detectability is high. (Iiighdetectability implies
ili an effective inspection proc,,dure.) If a part contaJn.s, oil the average,
,_I_ I0 cracks before inspectlon, detectabJl|ty must be very high if the part is to
_ be reliable after inspection.(b
Figure 7 is like figure 6, except that figure 7 applies to a case where
"i], 25 percent of the structure Is inaccessible for inspection. Because there is
,,, a chance that some of the randomly located cracks might be in the unlnspected
_i region, the curves in figure 7 are lower than the curves in figure 6. Note in
i: particular that I00 percent reliability cannot be attained, even if cracks are
V
I! i00 percent detectable. At mean of 1 flaw per part the highest that reliability .-
,_, can be is about 0.78.
;il Up to this point, unreliability has been defined as having an overlooked
crack; unreliability has not necessarily meant that a part will fail. (Ways to
_,i}]_: build crack-tolerant structures, where the seriousness of small undetected
_° _; cracks is minimized, are discussed subsequently.) Consider the case where an
! ._> overlooked crack grows longer under tile influence of stress changes due to gust
_ and maneuver loads. Reliability is redefined to mean that any crack present
;_! will not grow to be "critically long" before the next inspection. A critical
length may be the length at which the structure no longer supports limit loads,
i _'_ or some shorter length, perhaps one that only makes passengers nervous if they
_ i_i; see it. Whatever the chosen definition, critical length is some fixed value
'_i_!i lengththat mustis not ber ached,exceeded, and the structure is reliable only if the critical
l
_i Figure 8 (ref. 4) illustrates a distribution function that represents
!=:_ crack lengths. Tile solid curve indicates that short cracks are likely to occur
_-, ;, much more often than long cracks do. After some initial flights the cracks
-° _¢ grow, so that the dashed llne represents the new crack length distribution.
_ _i During inspection, tlle longer cracks .ire likely to be discovered and fixed, so
!' that the dashed-dot line represents tiledistribution after inspection. The
" '_i_ dashed-dot llne fairs into the dashed curve at the limit of detectability-
_ shorter cracks are not detectable. During subsequent flights, unrepaired
=:;_,i_ cracks continue to grow.
°_ii Figure 9 shows tlle results of an analysis that recognizes growing cracks.
°_; The two curves illustrate the relative impact of various inspection schedules.
.i_ The abscissa is the frequency of inspection; it is t|le number of inspections
<:;_ scheduled during a period whose length is such that a just-detectable crack can
,_I: grow to crltlcal length. The two symbols have the following definitions:
2,:
i tc is the time at which a crack just becomes critically long and td is the
_o._" time at which tlle crack becomes long enough to be detectable (for example,
'! . detectable 90 percent of the time). The curve l'.lj2 iilustrate:_ the reliability
_-5'[_i, for surviving one ilispcctloH p_l'i_,,wJt.llIt_.'init|a[ .in:U>i,ctlon.'l!a,ct,rvu, '01is for survival of ore. P_,riod with ;;14 iuitial in._q,uctio, 4 it i:. ,li_l,_,r t,ecau:;e
'U"[', the e;_tra inspc,cti<m i:; lih,.Iv t,, di.';c,v,r ra,i_ _r,lcl..:[i,.:tc<,uld l'r<,wto triLl-
o,- cal length between ilh';l,vt ti_,li:,.
;._--::I , ,_+IINAEPAGF_ IS
i _.<.: _,t,7',)ll QUALrI,'
_%_
_-- ........... : - .,,,_ --.i, _,,, _................ ;* .....
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ENItAN C liNG RI'H,I/:I_ i L I TY
It ts heJpfuJ of course, to know what size clac'l, l,,u:;t m l,m1:d t,, It,,, I, tha,
structure reltabl_, b_'tween hlspt, c:timl_. Figurt, I0 shc_vm "._ial,," , r;_c;. ].l:_:th,;
• plotted against tl,e norr,,'llized inspection frcqum,cy. First, 1_,,,;. ;_t tl,_, curw.
for a criLici:l crack length a c of 100 I._,. At a frtquency ,_l t_.:c_ in._;pt, ctiol_s
durin E the, norI.i;;1 pt,riod, all cracks shorter tim:if4 1.7 i.;u J,,u:;t :,_. ,_.tcct_.d. tin
tile other llalld, if ii c = -' (in an infinitely tOLi;',ll urt,rial), ;!,iii,,.',pcctt,r
must still find al.1 cracks lon_:,er thml M.5 z,ua, so switcLin_, t._ a t_mgii imtcrial
UOeS llOt IIclp laUC:l whel.1 iI1Spt'ctioIlS lift. lilfrt, qUtllt, l't,r i',(,rt, Irt.qucllt in._;pt,c -
lions tolerable creel" lell6tlls ,-ire ]ollgt'r_ but tlJSt, Lilt" Ctll'Vt':; ,%Ct';ll'_ltc. '_oU_'her
materials can hell) to alleviate an inspe.ction detectal, t l ity t, roi, i,.,;, if inspec-
tions are frequent, if the structure rt_l::ain,q :_trcmg evt,n witi, l.od,.ratvl.'- Jim6
cracks, then, of course, it tel.rains reliable. }illlCt' a rxuh.r:ltt, lv hmb crack
! Call be cletecteu _.,orc easily thilll a sllorl; cracl., the uetectabi I i ty prol,lt,:., is
_ l,.oderated, and the structure is ::_ore likely t_, be repairt, d hi, fore thu crack
, becor.,es critically long.
Figure ii (ref. 6) shows how tile choice of u.aterial ]ntiucm.c.,_ pvrfc_rn::mc_:.
For structures in tension, such as tiw Ir_w_,rwing surface, ,_;trc:;s/_.n._ity is _
measure of the load-carrying ability per pound of structurv, di};l_v:ilucs on tae
ordinate indicate efficient structures. Ti,e lift rc.quirclacnt is ti.c lilt o| the
: aircraft, or, l:crhaps as ill this discussiua, the time b,twvcn inslcctiolm, i'.:c
}:- initial flaw (crack) sizc is tll_, h.l.gt,l _,_ a crack .lust n l,it :;r.:_ll, r th.m tlwt
which can be dctectud. _6ac ste_l i:, tht t,ost eft]tit, hi c,t [_iw thl,_ ,.'_:ttrJ;_/s
, if very suall cracks, for exalaplu_ 1 l,;.;, can b_. iuulld, i ital:iul.. 1:; i_.:;t ii t,
: so_:ewhat longer dracl; must he. tuleratet;; I;ut crncks _,rm,: rt. latlvt, lv :'_.at in
_ ' titaniuu, so the useful tilt. is not as long as for 202,_-13 site. it,t:..: v;h[_, cat,
tolerate: il,L1c]l longer cract.s than the otht.r two u::tcr_::l, c:,n.
in additioll to C!lOOSillg tilt' proper ll;lt[,ria], ti_. :,tructurt itsc. lf C;.I! IK'
'.-, made crack tolerant (rot. 7). Figurc 12 ms m,t only :_ sr._l,n t,1 rc._lLm._
: strength, it is also a sketch of a i-,ltllt.1 with I i'.', t_._, :_tril t: w. Only tie, rigl:t
half of tim l)mluJ is sketched; the pam, l i:: :;VI;.l:._tFit _ii,,_,t t_,,.' v_.rti_Ji t'tI;t_,l"
linv (the t_rdinatv), only ont.-half of ti_c cry,el i:, :.i.,,_q_, it, t,, , i;; ;,,:.i: t tI ic.
Figure 12 simws how riw.t_,d strin_;t t':: }a. li_ t_, r,.t;:iu t}.,, i,,,,_-_.,rrvih): ;l.ilit.v
of a crackt.d plat,,. ,!ere l_md-carry!n_; ,.!,]lily i,. i,!,tt,,: _r;_i_::-t ,*r,c;. l_.ny.t}_.
'lhe dasiIed ]lilt, ,.,h,,w:-; tnc strtngtl_ _.1 ,, i,l:_t, ; i I.t _:. :,I i l!,q:, _.. .': t:,, t,.r-
C£'lltl!gt' Of material [n tilt, stilft,llt,l:, ill_,l, ;t_,,: . ,,, ,:, _ [ :,, 1,,,_ . , ,_1 1'. il/t' ,
ability. 'lhis is becaust, the. still,.nt.r:; pi, i _:i ti_, r, 'i, n ! 1......., t?., clat_
passes Ull,lt.rlll,,lth. [;Olltt. structures hav_ i;,t, _ r.. ] : t i : 1, v, I ,. [l,..t_ ..,. ,.: I i\'t :,._i
stifft'nt'r:_; a l,.lnt'] with int.cgral btill,._tl: ..... . .. ,:: _ .... .._ , .,.,, i,,;_ r.wct
IIS a l)llllt, 1 Witil(,ut :'t[fft,Ilt.r..; l)t,t';lll._;v Ill,, :;,_ i! I, 1 , I" :, , _ . I,., -,,.
Thus pr_,pcr l::;lt,.ri;l[:: ;illd Ct'lh_;tl'tlt'[it'l. _:_?,,'..' , ;' : '_ ._:; , 1, I,_', I
cracks Call b{, t(,lcr;ltt,d, ;rod ;lI1 Jll_;l't', t_,! i" , I' . i; : , ' ,_' : ;_,,.
_' lollg cr_lc!'s
i,
/[
: ;: 358
00000004-TSG05
r _ I'L _" ' f
' I I
. t
'}_ I !c
::_, MINIMIZING COSTS OF OPERATION
"Ji Reliability methods can be applied to economy of fleet ,peratlon. Fig-
ure 13 (ref. 8) shows the cumulative cost of _nspectlon and r,q,alr plotted
_i" versus design lifetimes. The data are for a fleet of fightur aircraft with a
_(_i_ design life of 6600 flights. Tile alreraft are inspected rvery 2200 flights.
! The top curve is total cost, and the next is repalr cost; the dash-dot curve isoo
_ inspection cost. Repair cost is the major contributor to total cost. Note that
!_" the cumulative total cost and cumulative repair cost beg_n Jncreaslng rapidly
_ after the aircraft has been in service for two lifetimes. Figure 14 is the same
_ data for inspections scheduled every II00 flights. It is cheaper to inspect and "
! °_' repair every II00 flights, chiefly because cracks remain small and are cheaper
to repair. For example, small cracks near holes can be fixed by reaming the
_°i hole, whereas larger cracks may lead to _qJor rework. The iowc,r repair cost
_';._',, more than offsets the larger inspection cost.
-'_ Of course, the cost of extremely frequent inspection might overwhelm the
__:_,_, gain in repair cost, and consequently an optimum inspection frequency exists
,_, (ref. 9). Figure 15 shows how this optimum can be found. (Some commercial
transport data were used in computing this figure.) The ord_natt, i._ the total
operating cost, including the expected cost of failure of the aircraft, divided
._ by the cost of failure. (The expected cost of failure is generally low, because
_./_ it _S the product of the cost of failure and the unreliabil_ty, and the unre-
• liability is a very small number.) The cost of failure can include replacement
_I_ cost, insurance losses, ancillary damage, lawsuits, etc. The abscissa Is the
,__:_ number of scheduled inspections per design lifetime. The parameter for the
i-;-_ various curves is tile inspection cost divided by the cost of failure. Eachcurve has a minimum, located by the dashed llne; at which the expected operating
i=_ ii'.: costs are minimized.
._. In figure 16 some data have been added to figure 15. The dot-dashed curve
:_'I is the probability of failure, calculated by methods somewhat like those dis-
•_. cussed previously. If operations are to be constrained to some value of unre-
_"_,-_".... liability, such as 10-3 (reliability of 0.999), then each aircraft must be
[:_.: inspected at least seven times during its design lifeti,ne. Thus, for a para-
metric value of 10-3 , the aircraft must be inspected more often than it would
_ have been to minimize expected operational costs. But for param_.tric values
•I of 10-4 and smaller, the minimum cost number of inspections h, ads to rt,liabillty
greater than 0.999 Thus, for certain values of the paramt_tcr, t,nhanccd relJ-
:'-_ ability and lower operational costs go together.
,1
_'. To sum up, Inspection effectiveness depends upon structural c_,,q_l_.xity,
_i: quality, and the percentage of _he structure inspected. ,<.,liabillty can br
°i: enhanced by choosing materials properly, designing damagt,-tol,,r;mt :;tructures,
:; and increasing inspection frequency. And, for flc,:t operation,_:, ,,,:.t_ c;,. l,t,
"_ minimized through proper inspectlon schedules, ;t11,1 _,ntl¢_la_'_'tl rt,l lal, [ l i tv c,ln bt,, o
, ,, compatible with minimum cost.
: y' 359
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